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MMS control sequence: SBO, Operate and AddCause
Choose the control model, the command and what happens in the bay. The tool builds the sequence between the client, the IED and the breaker with every service, its MMS write or read, the time and the cause of the rejection. Click a step to see it on the drawing.
Results
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Charts
How it was calculated
MMS messages of the sequence
| # | Time | Service | MMS |
|---|
What it is for
An IEC 61850 command from the HMI or the control centre is not a single write: depending on the control model there is selection, operation, confirmation of the end and, if something fails, a report with the cause. This tool builds that sequence to read a Wireshark capture, understand a rejection during commissioning or test the gateway.
How the sequence is built
Source: IEC 61850-7-2:2003, cl. 17; IEC 61850-8-1:2004, cl. 20
Selection
normal security: Read SBO (empty = rejection); enhanced: Write SBOw with ctlVal, origin and ctlNumAt selection the IED checks the control hierarchy, whether another command is running and its own health. The selection lasts sboTimeout.
Source: IEC 61850-8-1:2004, cl. 20, tables 69, 76 and 77
Operate and rejection
Write Oper; rejection with enhanced security = InformationReport LastApplError { CntrlObj, Error, Origin, ctlNum, AddCause } then Write.response failure; with normal security, only Write.response failureOn operate, the selection, the position and the interlocking are checked. AddCause gives the cause: 2 hierarchy, 4 invalid position, 5 position reached, 10 interlocking, 18 object not selected.
Source: IEC 61850-8-1:2004, cl. 20.9
End of the operation
enhanced security: CommandTermination+ (InformationReport of Oper) or − (LastApplError and Oper)With normal security only the report of the new state arrives; if the breaker does not move, the client receives no cause.
Limits of the simulation
- What is checked at selection and what at operate depends on the manufacturer; the tool uses a typical split.
- It does not model TimeActivatedOperate, the operate-many class or the test bit.
- The MMS variables follow the name CSWI1.Pos of the logical device you type; your SCD may use another.
- It does not replace the control tests in your substation. The example cases are illustrative.
Frequently asked questions
What changes between normal and enhanced security?
With enhanced security the IED confirms the end of the operation with CommandTermination and, if it fails, sends LastApplError with the cause. With normal security the client only knows that the command was accepted; if the breaker does not move, it finds out because the change of state does not arrive.
What does AddCause 10 mean?
Blocked-by-interlocking: the interlocking (CILO) does not allow the operation. It is the most common rejection during commissioning, together with the control hierarchy (AddCause 2) and the position already reached (AddCause 5).
Why does Operate fail if I already selected?
Because the selection expires with sboTimeout. If the operator takes longer than that time between selecting and operating, the IED answers Object-not-selected (AddCause 18).
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